Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: Land restitution in Colombia by Nilsson, Manuela & Taylor, Laura
Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: Land
restitution in Colombia
Nilsson, M., & Taylor, L. (2016). Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: Land restitution in
Colombia. DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2016.1231844
Published in:
Conflict, Security and Development
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Conflict, Security and Development on [date of publication],
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14678802.2016.1231844.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:09. Sep. 2018
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying the security-development nexus on the ground:  
Land restitution in Colombia 
 
 
Manuela Nilsson1 
 
Laura K. Taylor2 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Linnaeus University, Sweden 
2 Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland 
  
 
Abstract 
The general consensus on the security-development nexus is that both are key to 
achieving sustainable peace in war-torn societies. However, this debate has largely taken place 
among international actors, with little empirical evidence about how security and development 
relate to each other or are even considered by local actors. The current paper applies the security-
development nexus to the case of land restitution in Colombia. Following decades of internal 
armed conflict, in 2012 the national government passed sweeping land restitution legislation 
amid on-going violence. Through in-depth interviews and focus groups with multiple actors 
involved in this process, ranging from international organizations to national government units, 
from regional institutions to local communities, the paper analyses the objectives, impact, 
challenges and opportunities for land restitution related to security and development. 
Undermining peacebuilding, a lack of coherence in the integration of security and development 
priorities limits the extent to which either supports, or is promoted by, land restitution efforts in 
Colombia. The paper concludes with reflections on how the security-development nexus may 
promote peacebuilding amid on-going conflict. 
 
Keywords: security, development, Colombia, land restitution, reparations, peacebuilding 
 
Acknowledgements  
This work was supported by the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in 
Research and Higher Education (STINT) on Expanding Approaches to Conflict and 
Peace awarded to Manuela Nilsson, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden, in partnership 
with Laura K. Taylor, University of North Carolina at Greensboro. The research would not have 
been possible without the generous support and collaboration of multiple partners and 
individuals in Colombia, in particular Lorena Amezquita, Paola Forero, Katerine Hernandez and 
Diana Carolina Puerto. Finally, we are grateful to all of the participants for sharing their views 
and contributing their voices to this analysis, as well as to the editor and two anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable feedback.  
 
  
Author Biographies: 
 
Manuela Nilsson (Ph.D.) heads the Department of Peace and Development Studies at Linnaeus 
University (Sweden). Her research and publications focus on peacebuilding, particularly 
reconciliation processes, the role of civil society, civil-military cooperation and the application of 
the nexus between security and development at the local level.   
 
Postal Address: 
Department of Peace and Development Studies 
School of Social Studies 
Linnaeus University, Växjö 
351 95 Växjö 
Sweden 
Phone: +46 0470-76 7442 
Email: manuela.nilsson@lnu.se 
 
Laura K. Taylor (Ph.D.) is an Assistant Professor in political psychology at Queen’s 
University, Belfast. Her research applies a risk and resilience framework to examine the impact 
of political violence on children, families, and communities. Her research appears in Journal of 
Peace Research, Political Psychology, and Peacebuilding, among others.  
 
Postal Address: 
Queen’s University, Belfast 
School of Psychology 
Belfast BT9 5BN 
United Kingdom 
Phone: +44 028 9097 4217 
Email: l.taylor@qub.ac.uk 
 
  
  
Introduction  
Renewed conflict, stagnating development and a dismal security situation in many of 
today’s war-torn societies continue to fuel the peacebuilding discussion and underline the 
urgency to find appropriate responses to complex conflicts.i One vital part of that debate is the 
discussion around the nexus between security and development in order to better respond to 
overlapping development and security challenges.ii It is widely accepted within the international 
community today that sustainable peace is based on re-establishing basic security and 
development conditions that are interdependent.iii However, limited empirical research has 
investigated how these concepts function together or the impact of those bi-directional relations 
on local peacebuilding more broadly. 
This study responds to the call for more empirical and context-specific studies of the 
actual functioning of the nexus on the ground and the problems evolving from that process.iv It 
looks specifically at how the nexus applies to a vital component of contemporary peacebuilding 
activities and a clear example of how the concepts of security and development can be 
interconnected: land restitution in Colombia. Given the long history of conflict over land 
ownership, a high level of continued insecurity and the historic land restitution law in 2012, 
Colombia’s process offers a key context to examine the dynamic interaction between security 
and development on the ground.  
This research was conducted two years into a ten-year process as outlined in the 2012 
law. Thus, the findings are offered as reflections to improve policies and implementation in 
Colombia, and possibly in other settings of protracted conflict, rather than as a final evaluation of 
the land restitution process itself. In this light, the paper analyses the objectives, impact, 
challenges and opportunities of land restitution as contributing to improving security and 
development levels to achieve sustainable peacebuilding in the department of Córdoba, the 
designated pilot area for the first land restitution processes. Córdoba is a key setting for studying 
land restitution and the security-development nexus because of the large imbalance in land 
distribution has fed high rates of poverty and a long history of violence. Attempts by landless 
peasants to push through land reforms during the 1970s and 80s had only achieved limited 
results and was brutally suppressed by paramilitary and guerrilla groups. In 2012, the rate of 
rural poverty was 66% in in the region, well above the national rural poverty rate of 46%.v  
Due to the on-going nature of the restitution process, we selected two focus groups of 
approximately 20 participants each to understand different phases of the process. The first focus 
group included a local community that already received land and was approaching the end of the 
two years of governmental support and accompaniment. The second focus group consisted of 
farmers who are still awaiting final restitution. Focus group interviews were chosen over group 
and individual interviews in order to allow for less structured discussions within the groups in 
which the researchers became participant observers. It was important for us to first see how focus 
group participants perceived the land restitution process and which problems they would bring 
up by themselves. After that, questions concerning development and security issues were 
included in the general facilitation of the talks.  
To complement the local understanding of land restitution, we also conducted 25 in-depth 
interviews with key stakeholders in Colombia. These individual interviews were conducted with 
a broad selection of the primary actors involved in the land restitution process, ranging from 
international organizations and government institutions such as the Unit of Land Restitution and 
the Victims’ Unit in Bogotá, to regional judges who ruled on land restitution, to NGOs involved 
in helping victims to get their land back, to members of local and national police and military 
units. 
The overall findings underline that the land restitution process in Colombia has so far 
neither produced more development nor more security – in fact, it has worsened the latter. Three 
key points emerge from the discussion about challenges and opportunities for land restitution. 
First, the impact of land restitution on peacebuilding in Colombia is severely limited by the 
understanding of the processes primarily in terms of reparations for victims. Second, the scope 
and sustainability of the land restitution process needs not only a broader and more long-term 
vision in terms of its opportunities for peacebuilding, but also substantially more resource and 
coordinated planning between different actors to meet its objectives. Third, greater sensitivity to 
the potential of renewed conflict over land distribution and ownership needs to be practised and 
preventive policies put in place to improve both local security and rural development. The paper 
concludes with reflections on how better integration of local perspectives and experiences with 
regard to land restitution may advance the national and international debates on the security-
development nexus, and how the Colombian case may inform peacebuilding efforts in other 
areas mired in protracted conflict.  
 
Debates on the security-development nexus 
The idea of a nexus between security and development was already an important element 
in the state policies of colonial as well as post-colonial regimes during the Cold War,vi where 
development aid was used to increase security levels and counter-insurgency strategies included 
development activities. The end of the Cold War and particularly the promotion of conflict 
prevention strategies significantly expanded the scope of the development and security agendas 
and pushed the nexus debate forward as an important part of today’s policy arena.vii At the same 
time, the concept of human security that emerged in the 1990s connected a number of basic 
human needs to the concept of security, further causing both areas to overlap in terms of actors 
and agencies. As Spear and Williams (2012, 2) point out security or development are “arenas of 
thought and practice” that do not involve monolithic groups of actors or agreement over core 
issues, methods or policies but rather entail many different approaches and issues. As contested 
concepts, security and development are usually defined in negative terms, as alleviation from 
threat and need respectively. Originally, the term development focused on the goal of poverty 
reduction, greater economic prosperity and opportunity, while security was defined as the 
protection of a society from external threat, synonymous with national security. Today, the 
expanded term of human development includes issues such as governance, education, the 
environment and human rights and thus merges somewhat with the contemporary extension of 
human security, which includes every individual’s freedom from fear as well as from want. In 
this paper, a working definition considers development as the process of improving people’s 
lives and security as the protection from threats to core values.viii In 2005, the UN world summit 
called for integrated security and development policies in whole-of-government approaches. 
Menkhaus’ ‘vicious circle’ metaphor describes insecurity and underdevelopment as reinforcing 
each other and thus increasing the possibility for renewed conflict,ix a view largely adopted by 
the official discourse,x although recent research has begun to question that causal connection.xi  
 The general consensus that improving both is the key to achieving sustainable peace in 
war-torn societies has become a truism in academic as well as policy texts ever since the end of 
the Cold War.xii Beyond that general agreement, however, there is no consensus on just how both 
goals can be achieved and how they influence each other. As Stern and Öjendal have pointed out, 
the nexus is ‘differently experienced, imbued with meaning and ultimately carried out.’xiii The 
discussion particularly focuses on the question if security and development are interdependent in 
the sense that they reinforce each other and can therefore be achieved in combination,xiv or if 
there necessarily is a trade-off since both cannot be achieved at the same time.xv  
 The debate on the security-development nexus has largely been donor and policy 
oriented, and emphasis has been placed on globalized discussions among donor countries about 
how to best implement security and development in countries that are challenged on both 
accounts. In both academic as well as policy texts the nexus appears imprecise and malleable and 
has been criticized as lending itself to being abused by actors with vested interests, including 
legitimizing intervention.xvi Much criticism has been launched against donors’ inward-looking 
concerns for self-image and the preservation of their power positions rather than the interests of 
the intervened, while they simultaneously disengage from serious policy-making in the 
developing world. The donors, it is argued, pass responsibility on to other actors, thereby 
prioritizing rhetoric over policy responsibility.xvii  
 Critics also maintain that development and security policies are increasingly developed in 
isolation from practice and the actual needs on the ground.xviii Few studies have analysed 
possible trickled-down effects of the nexus debate to the national and local peacebuilding 
policies, or paid attention to local articulations around the nexus.xix One exception, Orjuela’s 
case study on Sri Lanka found a trade-off; security and development reinforce as much as 
undermine each other on the ground, forcing the local population to make tough choices.xx Her 
work shows that the security-development nexus actually consists of a complex web of linkages 
between different social, political, economic and cultural factors and further questions the truism 
on the positive and causal interaction between both concepts. It calls for greater research in 
specific contexts in which the security-nexus debate is played out through policy and practice 
aimed toward long-term peacebuilding. 
 This research uses the security-development nexus not as a hypothesis to prove positive 
or negative correlations between both peacebuilding goals, but rather as an analytical tool to 
evaluate the potential impact and challenges faced in a local context with overlapping security 
and development challenges. We build on the underlying premise that peacebuilding activities 
cannot be designed, formulated and implemented – be it at the local, national or global level - in 
isolation from each other. Both in policy and implementation, implications for security and 
development need to be considered so that they do not undermine, but rather actively contribute 
to, each other as basic pillars of sustainable peace.  
 
Land restitution and post-conflict reconstruction in Colombia 
Land is an important natural resource, serving as the literal bedrock for developing 
countries, tackling poverty by providing food security and export dividends. Unequal land 
distribution, sometimes with its origins already in colonial times, is prone to create protracted 
social conflict.
xxiii
xxi In many conflict scenarios land becomes a vital asset and changes hands in 
both legal and illegal ways, driving large sectors of the population from their farms and leaving 
agricultural land underused or destroyed.xxii In both scenarios the levels of security and 
development are greatly affected.  Part of post-conflict reconstruction therefore involves 
returning land to its rightful owners and establishing a more equitable land distribution.xxiv These 
policies have the double aim of reducing conflict – thereby increasing security levels – and 
spurring development and economic growth through rapid attention to agricultural production, 
for example. Thus, land restitution appears to be an exemplary topic to analyse how the 
theoretical debate on the security-development nexus applies to a local context. Thus, we aim to 
understand the extent to which, through land restitution, conditions of security and development 
reinforce or undermine each other on the ground.  
Applying the security-development nexus as an analytical framework rather than an 
outright hypothesis to a local context, this study analyses how land restitution, as a component of 
peacebuilding, has impacted levels of security and development, separately as well as in relation 
to each other. The findings underline that the interaction between security and development is 
neither a given nor necessarily positive and call for what Orjuela calls a ‘reality check of the 
abundant but often intangible theorizing and policymaking ventures concerning the nexus.’
xxvii
xxv 
Colombia is an important case on which to test the security-development nexus impact on land 
restitution because the country has a long history of conflict over land ownership and a high level 
of continued insecurity. Thus, in Colombia’s case, high levels of conflict and insecurity, 
triggered in large part over land ownership, have reduced development conditions for the local 
population and the country’s export potential in general, which in turn continues to facilitate high 
levels of insecurity,xxvi exemplifying Menkhaus’ vicious cycle.  
 Colombia emerged from colonial times with a tremendous concentration of land in the 
hands of large landowners, which led in the 1960s to the emergence of a civil war that continues 
to devastate the country to this day. Early attempts during that decade to push through an 
agrarian reform failed. Neoliberal policies focusing on land concentration as the best way to 
achieve rural development in the 1980s were joining in the following decade by an emphasis on 
biofuels and mining that led to even more concentration of land.xxviii Decades of conflict 
facilitated the accelerated process of concentration of agricultural land which brought with it 
over 6 million internally displaced people (IDPs), an increasing impoverishment of small farmers 
and the concentration of land in the hands of armed actors, completely destroying the social and 
productive fabric. But not only guerrilla and paramilitary groups are vying for land in this 
conflict; drug traffickers, state agents pursuing anti-drug policies and political control, and large 
landowners and enterprises that aim at enlarging economic production and natural resource 
exploitation join in as well.
xxxii
xxxiii
xxix After the Uribe government’s flawed 2006 attempts to demobilize 
the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia – AUCxxx – a coalition of death squads 
which had emerged in the 1980s to take on the guerrillas, another actor rose out of the ranks of 
the demobilized: so-called criminal bands, or Bacrim after its Spanish abbreviation. Bacrim 
groups have taken over control of drug trafficking in many areas now cleared by the state 
security actorsxxxi of guerrilla control and further contribute to pushing small farmers off their 
land, particularly in areas where the drug traffic needs safe passageways. Furthermore, fights 
over land between FARC units and Bacrim groups aggravate the security situation for farmers 
and continue to increase the number of IDPs in Colombia.  As a result, during the past thirty 
years, Colombians were pushed off 60,000 square kilometres of land.   
 Worn out by decades of internal conflict but encouraged by a new round of peace 
negotiations that started in 2012 and promise to conclude with a peace agreement within the next 
months, the country has commenced the land restitution process as a vital and integrated part of 
its peacebuilding policies. Colombia is one of the first countries to attempt such a complicated 
endeavour in the midst of on-going violence. While certainly a much needed and anticipated step 
towards peace, the actual context for land restitution amid on-going violence is complex: much 
of the land that needs to be returned to its rightful owners is still under the control of the guerrilla 
and other illegally armed groups, serving either as coca production areas or land routes for drug 
trafficking. Some of the land was acquired by businesses under fraudulent circumstances, even 
though current business on that land is completely legal. Large corporations dealing with 
agricultural export production and mining companies are also reluctant to give away their land 
and use both Bacrim groups as well as military units to protect their land – including against 
peasants reclaiming it as part of the process of land restitution.xxxiv  
Furthermore, land dispossession does not seem to stop, even though land restitution has 
started: a recent report by the Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) 
found that 259,146 people – 70,000 families – fled their communities in 2011. The same year, 
CODHES reported 58 new mass displacements – defined as 40 people or more – affecting more 
than 26,000 Colombians.xxxv Thus, the nexus debate’s premise that security and development are 
interconnected appears to be correct at least in its negative ‘vicious circle’ connotation: 
insecurity and underdevelopment negatively impact each other in the case of Colombia.   
  
Objectives of land restitution in Colombia 
Land restitution in Colombia is anchored in the current peace negotiations in Cuba under 
agenda point one, as well as in Law 1448, the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, the 
Victims’ and Land Restitution Law, often shortened to ‘Victims’ Law’, signed by the Colombian 
Government in June 2011, which became effective in January 2012. Envisioned as a project to 
span the next ten years, the Victims’ Law is to aid in the reparation to victims through restitution 
of millions of hectares of lands abandoned or stolen as a result of human rights abuses and 
violations. In fact, the number of victims covered by the law constitutes 14% of the entire 
population, a very ambitious goal.xxxvi The law creates two separate but interconnected units to 
head both tasks, the Victims’ Unit (Unidad de Víctimas, UV) and the Unit for Land Restitution 
(Unidad de Restitución de Tierras, URT), and involves three phases. In phase one, the 
administrative phase, victims hand in land claims to the URT, which consults with the Ministry 
of Defence if the requested area provides the minimum safety conditions required for land 
restitution  – a process called macro- and microfocalization  – investigates the ownership and 
current status of the land and registers the claim. In phase two, the legal phase, specifically 
assigned land restitution judges evaluate the case and decide on a sentence and the procedural 
details of its execution.xxxvii
xxxviii
 In the final and executive phase three, a number of actors, among 
them the URT and UV as well as the judges, the Agrarian Bank, local security as well as regional 
governmental actors, are expected to cooperate in order to provide the conditions for claimants to 
resettle on their land, providing funds for fencing, clearance, tools and maintenance to enable 
production, as well as security, housing and other basic services such as infrastructure, 
educational and health services, water and electricity.  
 Despite the seemingly obvious and intimate connection between the land restitution 
process and levels of development and security, state actors in Colombia, at least at the national 
level, maintain that land restitution is predominantly part of a reparation process to victims. 
Guided by that rather exclusive objective outlined in the Victims’ Law,xxxix most state actors 
connect land restitution mainly to the reconstruction of the social fabric. The importance of land 
restitution in the process of the reactivation of rural development and the belief that development 
will increase levels of security are mentioned more as a bi-product by national actors.xl They are 
not expressed as goals of land restitution in the Law and therefore translate only sporadically into 
praxis at the local level. The URT, the government’s main land restitution unit, is increasingly 
interested in the connection between restitution and reconciliation, rather than placing the 
process itself within the context of the nexus between security and development.xli Even security 
actors at the national level stick to the script of the Victims’ Law and connect land restitution to 
security and development only at a lower level, at least at the national level.
xliii
xlii Security actor 
presence in land restitution areas, for example, increases during land restitution processes, but 
only short term, and the task descriptions and involvement of police and army forces are often 
unclear and blurred.  The efforts of the Defence Ministry’s special intelligence unit on land 
restitution continues to be predominantly engaged in determining if minimal security conditions 
exist to initiate the process of microfocalization in the first place, rather than gathering 
information on the effect of land restitution on security levels while the process goes on.  
 However, the awareness of the need to connect development and security issues to land 
restitution in a more integral way becomes increasingly apparent the more state actors are 
actively engaged in the process at the local level. Police and army officials in Córdoba’s regional 
capital Montería talk less about victims’ reparation and place much more emphasis on land 
restitution as a way to recuperate rural production and increase security. For them, development 
increases security, particularly if peasants who are finally able to produce again defend their turf 
and collaborate with local security actors.xliv In fact, the local URT director regards re-population 
of the rural areas to spur rural development and increase food and general security levels in the 
countryside as the main objective of land restitution.xlv 
 Both local focus groups, on the other hand, seem to be rather distanced from regarding 
land restitution as a process to increase development and security levels. They underlined that 
land restitution is an act of justice, something that the state owes the rural population.xlvi 
Establishing their livelihoods, the result of land restitution, falls therefore in their minds more 
into issues of justice and reparation as well. Neither focus group mentioned increased levels of 
security as an objective they connected with the land restitution process. 
 Impact of land restitution on security and development 
Despite a legal and procedural framework structure that seems clear on paper, the 
Colombian land restitution process is limping behind: less claims than expected were actually 
issuedxlvii
xlviii
 and after three – of a total of ten – years assigned to the process, only two per cent of 
the land has been returned by the end of 2014.  Land concentration as well as dispossession 
continues.xlix The causes of the protracted social conflict in Colombia therefore continue to 
persist. Furthermore, land restitution in its current form does not fully contribute even to its 
proposed goal: to repair harms done to victims. While a number of participants who had already 
returned to their land were grateful for the opportunity to return,l the system excludes a large 
number of victims claiming land in areas that are not security-cleared;li and what is more, it 
provides the ground for renewed victimization by not including victims of new displacements, 
for example by the new Bacrim groups. 
 Furthermore, the Colombian land restitution process has not helped to decrease levels of 
violence and conflict, but has instead rather increased insecurity. Continued high levels of 
violence and competition over land between armed actors constitute obstacles to the process of 
microfocalization that starts land restitution; and even if land has been declared ready to be 
restituted, threats to actors involved in land restitution and to returning peasants as well as 
insufficient means of long-term security actor presence prevent many from returning.lii 
Corruption among state actors in the countryside and even at the national level, as well as a lack 
of accountability for large landowners contribute to the obstacles for restitution and heighten 
levels of insecurity.liii In fact, many participants in the focus group waiting to be restituted to 
their land dwelled extensively on their worries concerning low levels of security, even though a 
new group of police, called carabinieri,
lviii
liv has now been specially trained to secure the return of 
farmers to their land. The Victims’ Law itself is very elaborate on the administrative and judicial 
processes of land restitution, but mentions police support for the actual hand-over of restituted 
land only in passing.lv The Law talks extensively about the potential threats victims are exposed 
to and even announces special protection programs for victims returning to their land.lvi Still, 
incidents of violence committed by armed actors who refuse to give up their land together with 
fear of the newly arranged anti-restitution armies – see below – greatly hamper the process, even 
though the levels of violence differ in the areas this research focused on.lvii The focus group that 
was actually able to return to its land reported relatively low levels of current insecurity in the 
area but expressed strong security worries for the future. However, their fear that, following the 
law, governmental support, including that of the security actors at the local level, will cease two 
years after the judges’ decision has been issued, constantly creates new worries and feelings of 
insecurity and abandonment.  Furthermore, in about seventy per cent of the municipalities with 
land restitution claims, antipersonnel mines hinder the return of peasants.lix 
 Additionally, restitution in its current form not only revives old, but also generates new, 
conflicts over land. The same actors who pushed others off their land have declared warfare on 
the land restitution process itself.
lxiii
lx During the past years, many have become victims of 
assassination by opponents to land restitution, among them not only the claimants themselves, 
but also human rights workers, officials of the government’s Unit of Land Restitution and 
communal and land-rights leaders involved in the process.lxi Between January 2008 and March 
2014, 66 persons reclaiming land were assassinated.lxii Furthermore, anti-restitution armies have 
been created.  Often actors gang up with paramilitary groups protecting large landowners, 
which slows down the land restitution process considerably.lxiv  
 Corruption within state institutions further contributes to putting obstacles to the land 
restitution process and increasing the amount of land held by armed actors. The National Land 
Fund (Fondo Nacional de Tierras) who administers land controlled by ex-paramilitary members, 
for example, is accused of distributing land units on the basis of bribes rather than legitimate 
claims and often ends up giving land to fake peasant associations, set up by ex-paramilitary 
groups.
lxvii
lxviii
lxv The national land registry unit INCODER (after its Spanish initials Instituto 
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural) not only distributed land to pay political bills instead of 
compensating victims who were pushed off their land during the long conflict but also gave 
away land units to armed actors.lxvi Land recuperated from imprisoned AUC members and 
auctioned off by the government to landless victims, is often bought up by paramilitary straw 
men and thus brought back into the hand of illegally armed groups.  The FARC, itself accused 
of stealing huge swathes of territory – has attacked the initiative as well, labelling it a ‘trap’. 
According to the FARC, the government proposes restitution, while at the same time inviting 
corporations to claim chunks of the country for mega-projects, leading to more dispossessions. In 
parts of the country, fights over land between FARC and Bacrim groups aggravate the 
conflict.  This is not a new phenomenon, however. Since the late 1980s, paramilitary groups 
have been targeting and killing people reclaiming their land.lxix The government’s National Unit 
for Protection has received hundreds of applications for protection for those who are reclaiming 
their land.lxx With on-going violence and a low level of security for peasants returning to their 
land, the government essentially ends up sending those peasants as their ‘caballitos de batalla’  – 
little battle horses – into the fight against armed actors over land, as one interviewee put it.lxxi  
 Furthermore, the land restitution process has brought forth a plethora of new and 
potentially violent conflicts. Farmers reclaiming their land, for example, clash with current 
civilian occupants who have acquired the same land in good faith and without knowledge about a 
potential legal lack of clarity concerning the ownership of the land. The latter is hard to prove 
and there are no provisions for compensation for secondary occupants in the current law, which 
contributes to create new victims and a potential for more violence.lxxii
lxxiii
 Clashes have also been 
reported between returning peasants and so-called testaferros, persons hired by armed groups to 
occupy the land for them, as well as members of Colombia’s rich elite reluctant to return their 
land and with indigenous groups who pose collective claims over land. Peasants also report fear 
that former paramilitary group members who are just now serving prison sentences after the 
AUC disarmament in 2006 are soon to be freed and will return to the land now restituted to the 
former owners.   
 Last but not least, land restitution does not even seem to spur development. Agricultural 
reactivation, made theoretically possible by the land restitution process, has been hampered in 
practice by the fact that peasants cannot produce once they are back on their land, since they lack 
the basic services, including housing, water for irrigation, roads, electricity, and schools and 
health institutions as a condition to bring their families, all of which was promised along with the 
title to the land by the judicial part of the land restitution process.lxxiv The Victims’ Law also 
promises special protection programs for peasants who are threatened when attempting to return 
to their land.lxxv However, in the second focus group, participants who have already legally 
received their land back maintain that they have been unable to return because they cannot 
compete with the alliances between landowners and armed groups opposing their fight to get 
their land back. None of them had been part of the special protection program promised by the 
law. For them, lack of security and continued presence of armed groups is the obstacle number 
one that keeps them from taking up agricultural activities on their land. Many also reported that 
they are regularly paying bribes to local policemen in order to even visit their land or begin 
fencing their lots.lxxvi
lxxvii
lxxviii
 They also express a lack of faith that the on-going peace process will make 
agricultural production secure for them, underlining that the disarmament of the paramilitary 
groups in 2006 only created new illegally armed groups, the Bacrim, who continue to occupy 
land. In many cases, peasants who cannot go back to their land or start production move to the 
urban areas and abandon rural livelihood altogether, particularly the younger generations.  
Alternative options, such as financial compensation, restitution of land somewhere else and take-
over of land in insecure regions by the state, are offered in praxis in only a few exceptional cases 
even though the Victims’ Law offers these alternatives.  
 
Future challenges and opportunities through land restitution 
As in many areas of the world, unequal access to land was one of the main causes of the 
Colombian conflict. Moreover, the conflict itself displaced people, continuing to increase 
insecurity and hamper development. In this context, restoring the land to its rightful owners 
should have addressed one of the underlying causes of conflict. Additionally, according to the 
international community’s consensus on the security-development nexus, the process itself 
should have set development back in motion and improved security conditions. However, the 
findings underline that, so far, the land restitution process has neither produced more 
development nor more security. On the contrary, the process revived old conflicts and created 
new ones, thereby increasing the level of violence and the potential for more to come in the near 
future. Though not the only reason, increased insecurity is another obstacle for farmers returning 
to their land and therefore also jeopardizes rural development. Although this research comes 
after only two years of implementation of the Victim’s Law, the initial findings certainly call for 
caution against applying policies with the potential to influence security and development 
without fully taking these factors into account. As this case shows, land restitution, a 
peacebuilding activity with a potential to break the cycle of conflict and underdevelopment in the 
country by restoring land to its rightful owners, instead had a negative impact on both 
development and security.  
 So what went wrong in the Colombian case? This research argues that the international 
debate on the nexus does not necessarily influence and inform the national level of countries 
engaged in peacebuilding. Despite of the potential of land restitution to improve security and 
development, in the Colombian case the process largely aims to address reparations to victims. 
This focus on one predominant goal led to the failure to embed the land restitution process within 
the context of long-term security and development policies and to provide for the basic 
conditions to make land restitution sustainable, thus posing major obstacles for the 
implementation on the ground. However, local state actors are keenly aware of the potential of 
the land restitution process to improve both, security and development levels – as well as the 
grave consequences for failing to provide the conditions to do so.lxxix With their hands bound by 
the somewhat limited policy objective at the national level, local actors join each other in their 
frustration over the weaknesses of such an important part of peacebuilding.lxxx It also shows how 
little the nexus debate within academic and international cooperation circles is actually 
understood and internalized at the national and local level. 
 As a consequence, the land restitution process has so far been unable to improve security 
and development levels in the Colombian case. Since security conditions were not prioritized and 
therefore appear as very short-term in the Victims’ Law, high levels of insecurity impeded 
farmers from returning to their land, even when the legal process had been concluded in their 
favour. Instead of increasing security, land restitution has even led to higher levels of violence, 
conflict and insecurity; continued displacement deepens these risks. At the same time, land 
restitution has not led to development; the conditions (e.g., roads, social services, etc.) for rural 
reactivation were not sufficiently provided. Despite judges’ decisions that call for the realization 
of such conditions, local authorities are slow to respond, and restituted farmers are left trying to 
build a livelihood without the necessary public infrastructure.  
 So how could the land restitution process have increased security and development 
levels? Firstly, the Colombian land restitution process would have benefited from an expansion 
of its objectives beyond the mere reparation to victims. Without this inclusive approach to 
peacebuilding, structural conditions block local actors from taking steps to improve security and 
development. Complementing the focus on reparations, regarding land restitution as a process 
with a high potential to spur local development and increase conditions of rural security would 
have helped the overall peacebuilding process in Colombia.  
 Secondly, we argue that national planning should have embedded the land restitution 
process within the country’s security and development policies. Better coordination among 
different actors, additional funds and personnel allotted to this ambitious task,lxxxi and a longer-
term vision toward the entire process may have avoided many of the obstacles – such as lack of 
infrastructure, housing, and basic services – that were encountered in the process. Thus, 
integrated into the broader security and development structures, the Victim’s Law may have been 
able to mobilize additional support for the basic conditions and resources for a robust 
resettlement of farmers on their restituted land. This approach may advance successful and 
sustainable land restitution, which in turn could advance both peacebuilding goals of security and 
development. 
 Thirdly, a deeper understanding of the potential pitfalls of land restitution, particularly in 
terms of the maintenance of old and the creation of new conflicts over land, might have 
improved the security situation to a point where the return of farmers to their land could have 
spurred rural development. The allocation of sufficient security actors in restitution areas, along 
with anti-corruption monitoring during the process, and modification of the Victims’ Law to 
prevent new displacement could contribute to making land restitution in Colombia a success 
story. However, there is still time as the mandate of the law extends to 2022. The exceptional 
scope of this process amid violence, and its importance in terms of lessons learned for possible 
processes in other countries, merit a fuller evaluation throughout the implementation of the 
Victim’s Law.  
 
Conclusions  
This research underlines the importance of bringing the security-development nexus 
debate down to the local level and adjusting it to the local context, if security and development 
objectives are to be reached in peacebuilding processes. Our investigation found that, at the 
national level, a lack of understanding of the need to design and evaluate peacebuilding policies 
through the security-development nexus, not only undermined these objectives, but it also 
jeopardized the primary goal of the land restitution policy: reparations.  
In addition, at the international level, the frozen debate around simplified perceptions of 
how the security-development nexus works in a peacebuilding context is of little use to actors on 
the ground. Peacebuilding is a process that engages a wide range of policies, actors and 
activities, not all of which have security and development as their primary goals. However, the 
findings from this study suggest that peacebuilding activities should, prior to design and 
implementation, analyse their expected outcomes from a holistic perspective using the security-
development nexus. Isolating one peacebuilding initiative and its corresponding activities has the 
potential for failure and limited impact. More qualitative case studies are needed to show how 
peacebuilding may be advanced through the varied activities of the security-development nexus 
in different local contexts. As the Colombian case indicates, the perspectives and experience of 
local actors are essential for understanding the impact of the international debate. That is, the 
security-development nexus may hold particular power as an applied analytical lens to 
understand local impact of peacebuilding policies, rather than merely a theoretical debate. In 
other words, security and development should continue to hold prominent places as important 
peacebuilding goals. However, the nexus should be debated at both the international and local 
levels; the combination of those discourses may hold promise for the on-the-ground 
implementation of policies that improve security, development and sustainable peace.  
 So what has this research contributed to the debate on the nexus itself? Since land 
restitution was not explicitly perceived of or implemented as a policy to improve security or 
development, little can be said about causality here. However, our findings do suggest that 
increased insecurity through new conflicts has prevented farmers from returning to their 
restituted land, hampering development. There was less direct evidence that land restitution’s 
lack of success in spurring development has necessarily caused greater security issues. This set 
of findings support Spear and Williams’ conclusion that the relation between security and 
development has ‘points of both divergence and convergence that defy easy labels but that reflect 
the many actors, processes and issues in each’ concept and can therefore be labelled as 
‘selectively co-constitutive’.lxxxii Thus, we do suggest that both security and development levels 
might have been improved – therefore strengthening the argument that a nexus exists – if the 
policy had taken those objectives into consideration from the beginning. Since the process of 
land restitution in Colombia is still new, policy adjustments may be able to mitigate this 
problem, strengthening the primary objective of providing reparations to victims.  
 Our findings also suggest that future research on the security-development nexus should 
include an additional factor that has largely been overlooked: the impact of on-going violence. 
Although peacebuilding has traditionally been conceived as a phase following peace-making, or 
a negotiated agreement between warring parties,lxxxiii
lxxxiv
lxxxv
 today’s peacebuilding efforts more often 
occur amid persistent violence.  In contemporary protracted conflicts it is no longer realistic 
to delay the onset of development activities, social and political reconstruction, or the 
establishment of a state of law until an undefined future point of ‘peace’. Moreover, additional 
research shows that violence does not stop even when peace agreements are signed; it often 
endures and evolves, posing a danger to the sustainability of peace agreements.  
Peacebuilding activities are therefore forced to adapt to a context for which they were not 
designed, at least not originally. As the Colombian case has shown, high levels of on-going 
violence, coupled with corruption, have provided additional obstacles to the potentially positive 
impact of security and development on each other in the case of land restitution. To enrich the 
nexus debate even further, future studies of local contexts should look into the particular 
conditions and challenges on-going violence poses for security and development and their 
interconnected relation within peacebuilding.  
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